19-Democracy: Egyptian Style Part 1: How We Got Here

Democracy is unexplored and evolving territory in Egypt. When a sea of humanity demanded the removal of democratically elected President Morsi once his actions were increasingly seen as undemocratic, creating an almost phobic memory of the undemocratically elected “President” Mubarak, the protesters spoke in concert with their Turkish counterparts: a president must represent all of the people, even those without religious views (e.g. the Taksim Gezi Park protests). After eons of autocratic rule, it is understandable the reset switch was flipped so quickly. Like Turks, Egyptians resist the idea of a purely Islamic state. Unlike their neighbors, both share an intimate, cultural, economic, and physical connection with the West.

The LGBT revolution passed the tipping-point because of a simple fact: having a personal relationship with a gay person decreases gay prejudices. When the community as a whole came out of the closet (the new normal), straight people awoke, surrounded by LGBT coworkers, friends, and family. The darkness of prejudice, by definition, cannot stand long in the light of experience. Denying the rights of others is easy until one discovers a beloved among their ranks.

Turkey and Egypt awoke to a similar reality: loving the benefits of Western ways makes them increasingly difficult to reject or suppress. As this lifestyle spreads east and south into the dominant culture, resistance increases. For this reason, these two nations continue to struggle from within and beyond. Their fates are bellwethers of the neighborhood. Imagine what successful democracies might look like or on the other hand, what failed states might mean to the geopolitical future of Western influence in the region.

Digging into Egypt's Presidential Election numbers paints a grim picture of Morsi's initial enthusiasm gap and calls into question the true portion of the electorate the Muslim Brotherhood represents. Morsi's Constitution felt like something passed by the Bush administration shortly after 9/11. Suspending the Court's authority with an edict of absolute presidential immunity was an overreach so egregious as to be quickly rescinded by Morsi himself. The spiraling economy, the complete lack of political inclusion, the isolationism, the inflexibility, and the failure to address any of his significant campaign promises led to a civil revolt on par with the initial Arab Spring when the military stood with the people against Mubarak. Once again, the military backed the voice from Tahrir (Liberty) Square and implemented the euphemism: if first you don't succeed, try, try again.

One question still nags: why no recall? The millions of signatures on the Tamarod (Rebel) Petition was telling but far from an official vote. The Brotherhood's relationship with SCAF (the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces) between the removal of Mubarak and Morsi's inauguration tends to suggest a recall vote orchestrated by the government would have garnered deep skepticism. And furthermore, a Brotherhood success could have meant greater bloodshed. But of course, we'll never know those gray shades. We only know what happened today.

Consider: if Morsi was removed by a recall vote, one might imagine fewer martyrs would have been created this summer.